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ABSTRACT 
 
Starting from two case histories, where only after 
thorough Failure Analysis the suddenly appearance of a 
failure was linked to much earlier events, the possibility 
of improving the reliability and of adjusting the reliability 
prediction tools are discussed.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of Failure Analysis in the assessment of 
Reliability is widely acknowledged, and the most 
celebrated failure mechanisms have been granted along 
the years by the privilege of the introduction of process 
steps, in manufacturing microelectronics, that are solely 
dedicated to their prevention. Electromigration, corrosion, 
mobile charges, hot electrons, alpha particles, and latch-
up are taught to microelectronic process engineers to 
explain the origin of maybe half of the current 
technological solutions. 
Nevertheless, field failures still occur. 
Handling field failures is in general a difficult task, 
that is even worst for those Small-Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) that are small customers of the big 
microelectronic manufacturers: on one side, the overall 
small or medium volume itself of their production makes 
even few failures of statistical significance. Conversely, 
few field failures are not sufficient to adjust reliability 
figures, as failure rate, MTTF or π factors for any device 
in the most popular tools for Reliability prediction, whose 
direct application is of questionable utility just for those 
SMEs that are less armoured against reliability issues [1]. 
It remains the hope in miracles, that is in those highly 
accelerated methods that, often misunderstood, promise 
to increase the reliability of a system independent on its 
measurement. The problem is that field returns in general 
do not correspond to the failures produced during those 
tests. 
The role of Failure Analysis will be here defended, in 
its deep acceptation, where a complete chain links the 
root failure mechanism to the observed failure mode (and 
not only a SEM picture is displayed to show some 
burnout). Detection of a specific root cause, when 
achieved, is that answer that is able both to address 
proper corrective actions in design and/or process and 
also to indicate more sound values for reliability 
parameters. 
In this paper a couple of case histories in which the 
final damage of the component is associated to violent 
thermal phenomena are reported.  
The two cases are linked by the common situation of 
having been mistaken in their diagnosis at the SME's 
plants, or even at some commercial Reliability Labs. In 
both cases sudden events have been reported, which was 
correct for the failure mode, although not necessarily for 
the failure mechanism. The butler of the situation was 
then claimed to be some transient Electrical Overstress 
(EOS) or some unexpected Electro-Static Discharge 
(ESD), and attention was paid to identify (and to remove) 
possible transients on currents, voltages, and 
electromagnetic fields during the operations of the two 
systems corresponding to the failure appearance. 
The answers of the Failure Analysis were so subtly 
different to not completely destroy the first interpretation, 
but to back-date the occurrence of the root mechanisms 
well before the manifestation of the failure mode, and 
then displacing the focus from one class of operations of 
the failed system to some completely unsuspected others. 
To avoid confusion on the focus of the paper, it is 
here anticipated that the well known Aluminium-Silicon 
interdiffusion mechanism will be called into play for both 
cases, and its main features will also be recalled. 
Its role is only to witness the time delay between the 
first manifestation of the root mechanisms and the final 
failure modes.  
 
2. CASE STUDIES 
 
2.1 IGBT for racing car electronics 
 
A popular commercial standard-speed IGBT, optimized 
for minimum saturation voltage and low operating 
frequencies, mounted in TO-220AB package, and 
employed in the on-board electronics of a racing car, 
failed after very few hours of intense operation. 
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Fig. 1 Optical micrograph of the top surface after mechanical 
grinding. The dashed line defines the edges of the underlying 
chip. The view identifies the three sectioned metal connections 
(Emitter, Collector and Gate). The curvilinear lines delineate the 
carbonised plastic area, whose arrowed part belongs to the 
neighbourhoods of the original wire path. 
 
More specifically, after one day of repeated tests on 
the race circuit and regular switching off at night, the 
system failed because of the short-circuiting of the IGBT 
as soon as it was switched-on, on the next morning. 
The electrical measurements confirmed an overall short-
circuit, with some tenths of an Ohm between Emitter (at 
the top of the chip) and Collector (at the substrate), and 
some 4 Ohms at each of them vs. Gate. 
The first set of hypotheses pointed towards sudden 
stresses, like EOS or ESD due to some transient event at 
the switching-on. An accurate Failure Analysis was then 
started to find the evidence of the real mechanism. The 
first attempt to remove the plastic package by mixed 
grinding and chemical etching revealed (fig.1) an 
extended thermal damage of the plastic itself all around 
the thick Emitter wire. Carbonisation of the plastic mould 
prevented from uniform removal of the package, but a 
first strong indication for a catastrophic overheating was 
obtained.  
 
The absence of any electrical connection on the top 
of the chip to the Collector clearly indicated the short 
circuit as a bulk failure. On the other hand, the x-ray EDS 
inspection of the exposed section of the wire revealed a 
central core nearly completely made of Silicon, 
surrounded by a region rich in Silicon and Oxygen. 
The results were converging towards some strong 
vertical current flow, closer to some EOS event than to 
ESD, obviously the latch-up itself can be fired by a not 
destructive ESD event. Anyway, the dilemma of the 
sudden or progressive mechanism remains not yet 
resolved. 
The complete removal of the plastic package was 
then carried out (fig.2), together with a cross-section of 
the damaged area (fig. 3). As a result, all the fingerprints  
 
20 µm 
Al intrusions 
 
Fig. 3b SEM Detail of the Al intrusions. The polyhedric shape 
of the Al-filled cavities is a fingerprint of solid-state 
interdiffusion of Si into the overlaying metallic thin film. 
  
Fig. 2 DUT surface after the plastic removal. Pointed line 
indicates the direction of sectioning  
 
 
Si estrusions Poly-Si gate 
 
Fig. 3c SEM Details of the Si extrusions. The polysilicon gates 
(encapsulated in SiO2) look intact. 
Al Emitter 
Si 
Si extrusions Al
 
Fig. 3a General view of the sectioned area under the Emitter 
wire. Silicon extrusion into the Al metallization, and also Al 
intrusion into the Silicon crystal are displayed. 
500 µm 
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of Al-Si interdiffusion were present and manifest (fig.3 
a,b,c): 
1) the reverse Al pyramids, hanging from those parts of 
the top Silicon surface, laterally limited by the SiO2 
encapsulated polysilicon gates, where direct Al-Si contact 
makes the Emitter connection and 
2) the Silicon precipitates inside the original upper Al 
thin film. 
The key point is that the interdiffusion mechanism is 
not compatible with a sudden, transient phenomenon that 
would have resulted in fusion and chaotic re-
crystallisation of the vertical structure. It should be 
argued that during the limited life of the device, an 
overcurrent was allowed to flow, undetected, able to 
expose the die to excessive temperature.  
Another possibility is some missing control on 
thermal dissipation, mandatory for such a device. In that 
case the overdriving of the device could have raised the 
local temperature well beyond the specifications. 
In any case, a strong and sustained current must be 
indicted for the failure, independent on the sudden, and 
late, manifestation of the final catastrophic step. 
The origin of the overcurrent may be inferred by the 
statistics for IGBT devices, that indicate the latch-up 
mechanism as one the most frequent problems. The 
uncommon situation here is the relatively long survival of 
the device, up to its ultimate and irreversible short circuit, 
witnessed by the shown interaction at the wire contact 
and by the cracking of the die (fig.4).  
 
2.2. CMOS Microcomputer 
 
A single-chip 8-bit CMOS Microcomputer, employed on 
the control board of a boiler device for domestic 
application, failed in field operation, after passing the 
final production tests.  
The failure analysis ran parallel to the analysis 
performed, on specimens with identical history, by the 
manufacturer, based on the results obtained by an 
external well-known reliability centre. Their conclusions 
were: “It is considered that the destruction was caused by 
electrical overstress… check whether the supplied voltage 
at pin nn is stable”. In the manufacturer’s report, the 
sentence was modified by deleting the focus on some 
possible voltage instabilities, and adding the specification 
“such as overcurrent” after the words “electrical 
overstress”. 
In both cases, the responsibility of the failure was 
completely loaded on the customer’s shoulders and the 
corrective actions point only toward some not further 
specified controls on voltage or current. 
A preliminary characterization of a device of the 
same lot revealed the structure of the multiple metal layer, 
where a very large upper metal layer (fig.5) run over the 
most part of the peripheral circuitry.  
At a first glance, the optical inspection of the surface 
of one of the failed chips only showed minor damages 
(fig.6a), ill proportioned to the severity of the measured 
short-circuit: only a very small area showed some 
“burning” at the top metal layer in the region of the most 
Cu frame 
Silicon 
cracks
 
Fig. 4 section of the chip/thermal sinks structure. The creeks 
roughly crowd along the expected current/heat flux lines from 
the upper Emitter wire contact to the lower Collector surface. 
 
  
Fig. 6a  General view of the surface of the failed input pin of 
the first chip, upon removal of the plastic package. The arrow 
points to a small “burnt” area. 
 
 
Fig. 6b  Optical micrograph of the damaged area after 
sequential removal of polyamide (left) and nitride passivation 
(middle), and finally after HF (right) 
 
10 µm 
 
Fig. 5 Optical view of a cross sectioned device 
50 µm
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strongly failed input pin. No other evidences were found 
across the whole chip. 
Some new information came during the chemical de-
layering of the device (fig.6b): at the “burning” place, the 
nitride etch opened a hole into the upper metal layer, and 
the HF etch was not able to remove some islands of the 
lower metal layer. In general, this would be not strange at 
all, because some mix between silicon and aluminium, 
oxygen, possibly nitrogen and other elements is a normal 
effect of a thermal excess (fusion). The anomalous thing 
is that nothing looks melt: the upper metal layer displays 
a hole with indented boundaries, and the surviving 
“islands”, rich of Silicon as expected, simply preserve, 
like a cast, the shape of the original aluminium, with its 
edges and reliefs. 
The situation was even more evident on a second 
chip, where some more extended damage was observed at 
the surface of the failed pin. It is pointed out by the 
arrows in fig.7. The etch of the nitride passivation opened 
a hole (fig.7b) where the upper metal layer seemed intact 
(fig.7a). The edges of the hole strictly recall a 
polycrystalline structure, as expected for the aluminium 
layer. In fig 7b, and even more clearly in the SEM figure 
7c, the hole shows an intact lower level metallization or, 
at least, a layer that preserves the original forms of that 
layer. 
Upon HF cleaning of the surface (fig.8), the evidence 
arose for a central, small spot (arrowed) into Silicon from 
which a “Si-fountain” sprung from the substrate into the 
metal layers, branching into four different directions.     
This ultimately allows, with the aid of fig.7 that compares 
the same region at different etching levels, to individuate 
the connection of the different structures of the damage: 
Silicon (amorphous) was present at the top metal level, 
which caused its removal under the etch of the 
passivation, while Aluminium penetrated the Silicon 
bulk, and was removed during the HF etch. 
A 3D reconstruction [2] of the SEM images of the 
exposed Silicon surface (fig.8b) clearly shows the deep 
penetration of the damage (the interdiffusion “fountain”), 
This is the other side of that same Al-Si 
interdiffusion phenomenon that appeared for the IGBT 
analysis. In this case, indeed, not the Al penetration into 
Silicon, but the progressive substitution of Al by Si 
atoms, coming from some deep contact point, to be 
found, is displayed. It is the same phenomenon whose 
seeds have been indicated for the previous IGBT case as 
“Si extrusions”. The phenomenon is quite known, but it is 
always amazing to see the capability of Si to completely 
substitute Al, even preserving the shape of the metal 
layer. 
It should be noticed as, once again, the evidence for 
Al-Si interdiffusion does NOT state that it is the root 
failure mechanism: the small spot clearly addresses 
towards ESD. Anyway, it is a secondary consequence, 
whose occurrence witnesses that the device operated a 
relevant time after the first failure firing before reaching 
the short-circuit state that flagged the failure. 
Now, the interpretation of the failure is unavoidable: 
an original ESD event caused a local short-circuit, maybe 
not sufficient to directly bring the circuit to fail, but able 
 
Fig. 7 Optical view of the damaged area after selective 
polyamide (a) and nitride (b) removal. The SEM image 
corresponding to b is displayed in (c). The arrows point the 
interdiffusion region on the top metal layer. 
  
Fig 8(b)  SEM 3D reconstruction [2] of the same detail, 
showing the central source of the Si material. 
 
 
Fig. 8 (a) Optical view of the damaged area after complete HF 
etching.  
25 µm 
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to set up a small parasitic current, locally dense enough to 
fire the Al-Si interdiffusion mechanism.  
The progressive evolution of this phenomenon then 
brought the device to its ultimate state at the observed 
time. 
The relevant point is the casual occurrence of the 
discharge at some internal point of the circuits, but 
always under the wide upper metal layer. This suggested 
the possibility that not an I/O instability could cause the 
damage, but some capacitive coupling of the large 
parasitic capacitor, made of the upper metal layer and the 
substrate, and some huge electromagnetic disturbance 
near the device. The presence of a power switch very 
close to the board mounting the failed devices moved to 
introduce some specific protection (electrical shield and 
increased spacing between the critical elements), and the 
result was the complete disappearance of the problem. 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
 
The reliability prediction methodology proposed in [1] 
involves different approaches: empirical model prediction 
techniques, analysis of field return data about similar 
product, analysis of data about accelerated test and also 
failure physics of a single component, to asses the 
reliability of a new product.  
The failure analysis of the CMOS microcomputer 
described in the second case study is used to improve the 
calculation of the corrective factor K relative to  the 
control board in which the component is mounted. The 
information are used to decrease the value of λfs that is 
the failure rate of the control board obtained through 
graphical and numerical analysis of the field return data. 
The failure of CMOS microcomputer brings to the 
failure of the control board; but through the performed 
failure analysis this problem has been solved, so to asses 
the reliability of a new but similar board the λfs has to be 
cleaned by this failure returns. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Failure Analysis of devices in particular when failed 
in the field application, is not a deterministic science and 
enables us to establish only the most probable cause of 
the failure.  
In both reported cases the sudden occurrence of the 
failure mode was not related to any sudden firing of the 
root failure mechanisms, but other hidden causes have 
been identified, with completely different corrective 
actions with respect to the first interpretations. 
There is a simple and “correct” conclusion to this 
result: by means of thorough analyses, the first specimen 
(IGBT) was indicted for some higher sensitivity to latch-
up, and the second (CMOS) to external-induced ESD 
events. This could move to correct the corresponding π 
factors employed for calculating the actual failure λ, 
drawing a physically sound shortcut to the estimation of 
the reliability parameters for some critical devices of a 
given electronic system. 
But there is also another conclusion, maybe less 
polite, that considers the documented case of the CMOS 
as a standard: when a SME faces a failure problem, the 
answer from the manufacturer will likely address to 
customer’s responsibilities, possibly documented by some 
“official” report that displays a couple of pictures and 
indicts some “butler” as the culprit. Apart from any 
consideration about the integrity of intents of the parts, 
the problem exists of enabling the customer of a Failure 
Analysis to know if the paid job is good or not. 
Ten years ago [3], a paper dealt with the problem of 
reliability of the Failure Analyses [rue morgue], pointing 
out as many violations of a simple set of logical rules 
commonly occur also in authoritative Reports. A decade 
later, it seems that the situation did not improve, and that 
a whole class of customers remains undefended against a 
general lack of culture in reliability. A recall of those 
rules was worth of consideration in a recent paper [4]. 
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